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Abstract 
This paper highlights how contract incompleteness can threaten the performance of public 
procurement facilities management contracts during their implementation stages, based on a 
multiple case study comprising five public procurement services contracts. The paper takes a 
principle-agent view and with the unit of analysis being the contract itself. The paper shows 
that contract contingencies are almost inevitable and may stem from the written contract or 
from the participating organisations. Written and unwritten contract management mechanisms 
were used in practice to deal with contingencies as they arose in the services case studies 
examined. The paper found that written contracts do not always provide satisfactory remedies 
for unexpected contingencies. Ex post mechanisms were used to manage the contract including 
incentives, information systems and signals. Time, resource or position signals were used in 
all five cases and provided an effective mechanism to manage unexpected contingencies in 
written contracts that proved to be incomplete. 
 











Client organisations use contracts to specify the work to be carried out for them by contractor 
organisations. The performance of such contracts is of critical importance for both principals 
and agents (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The ex-ante preparation of written contracts is 
important to successful outcomes. So too however is the successful ex-post management of 
contracts. This paper looks at the use of signals (Spence, 1973) in managing the performance 
of contracts after the contract has been implemented. Signals can be used to deal with 
contingencies that arise unexpectedly and where remedies do not exist in the ex-ante written 
contracts. 
   
One means by which the procurement function supports the performance of the core business 
is through the supply of facility services (Haugen and Klungseth, 2017; Pitt et al, 2014). 
Contracts with service providers therefore are an important means for facilities managers to 
create value for their organisations. However, the value of incorporating service providers’ 
products, services, information, and personnel into client processes and operations is threatened 
when contract contingencies arise (Coenen et al, 2013). Contingencies, stemming from 
inadequate definitions of scope or an absence of quality benchmarks, or from inadequate 
planning of policy implementations or lack of strategic flexibility, can trigger facilities 
management (FM) contract cancellations or renegotiations (Ikediashi et al, 2012). The 
importance of contract performance to managers in the delivery of facilities management 
services to their organisations and the variety of threats to the successful implementation of 
such contracts prompted this study. 
 
Facilities managers using contracts with service providers rely on contract completeness and 
good relationships to address contingencies. Completeness depends on the careful design of 
the contract ex-ante, i.e. prior to its implementation stage. Good relationships between the 
parties after the contract are maintained through ex post measures such as managing disputes 
between parties and overcoming contingencies. Regardless of ex-ante mechanisms, such as 
detailed procurement and tender documents, difficulties may still arise in the implementation 
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stage. To deal with such difficulties, facilities managers must draw on ex post mechanisms to 
secure FM service delivery.  
 
This paper specifically examines mechanisms to manage public procurement FM contracts at 
the ex post stage. The paper reviews theories of contract and examines five cases of public FM 
services contracts at post-tender stage. Since public contracts require frequent public 
competitive tenders (Erridge and McIlroy, 2002) and view contract relationships as 
performance monitoring (Murray, 2009), these cases offer an opportunity to study ex-ante 
management mechanisms used by managers in the contexts of relatively inflexible written 
contract terms and short-term contract relationships. These contexts suggest challenges to a 
manager’s reliance on assumed contract completeness and good relationships to address 
contract contingencies, and provide an empirical basis on which to develop a credible 
conceptual model of ex post mechanisms for FM practitioners to better understand and manage 
contracts. The paper is organized as follows: first, it reviews the relevant theory in relation to 
contracts and contract management, then it presents findings from the empirical study of five 
cases, it then develops and puts forward a conceptual model, and finally draws conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
This section briefly reviews the literature on written and unwritten contracts. The section also 





Contracts are described as the efforts by parties in a voluntary exchange to align incentives and 
form governance structures to mitigate hazards and realise mutual advantage (Williamson, 
2002). While governance mechanisms should be farsighted (Williamson, 1999), in fact real-
world contracts are incomplete (Badenfelt, 2011; Nakhla, 2016; Oluka and Basheka, 2014) and 
may lack clarity or remedies (Walls, 2005). Therefore, despite ex-ante controls such as legal 
constraints (Potoski, 1999) ex post trade is only partially contractible (Hart and Moore, 2008). 
However well written, contracts will not sufficiently provide for some contingencies and 
remedies will not always be enforceable. As a result, implementation of contracts can be 
challenging (Hashim et al., 2016). In public sector contracts high levels of transaction costs 
have been found at post contractual stage due to a lack of procurement contract management 
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capacity among principals (Rasheli, 2016). Contract theory alone does not provide the FM 
practitioner with sufficient mechanisms to manage situations of unforeseen contingencies. The 
working relationship between the client and contractor (principal and agent) has been found to 
be a key enabler of good contract performance outcome (Lam, 2017; Lok and Baldry, 2014). 
It is proposed that consideration of agency theory and inclusion of the use of signals by the 
principal enables a better model of contract management to be developed. 
 
The theory underpinning contracts is held to be agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1985; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Logan, 2000; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Agency theory examines situations where 
an agent acts in a decision-making role on behalf of a principal (Ross, 1973). Agency theory 
proposes two mechanisms to manage ex post performance: a set of incentives inducing the 
agent to accept risks and secure outcomes, and an information system to measure performance 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). In an FM contract, the client may incentivise 
inputs by paying on a ‘time and materials’ basis, or outputs by paying a fixed price (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001).  Both approaches require an appropriate information system such as 
monitoring, reporting, or auditing to secure outcomes (Hansson, 2010). These ex post written 
contract management mechanisms are summarised in table 1.    
------------------------------------------ 
Table 1 approximately here 
-------------------------------------------   
 
2.2 Signals as a mechanism for managing unwritten contracts 
 
Shannon (1948) identifies the fundamental problem of communication as reproducing at one 
point a message that was selected at another point. He proposed a general model that comprises 
an information source sending a message, a transmitter transforming the message into a signal, 
which is assumed to import noise, with an inverse process undertaken by a receiver, which then 
passes the message and noise to a destination or person intended to receive the message. 
Authors have reduced Shannon’s model to the three essential terms of communication theory: 
the sender, the receiver and the information or communication that relates them (Stichweh, 
2000, p. 10; Warner, 2007, p. 318) (see figure 1). This signalling view of communication is 
important because it broadens communication to include actions as well as words. The 
expenditure of the sender’s time in social interaction (Spence, 1973) or spoken and unspoken 
communications of intentions (Rousseau, 1995) are signals which may influence the decisions 
of the receiver. Therefore the sender’s demonstrations or actions are means of communication 
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which, in addition to spoken and written communication, are significant in influencing the 
receiver. In principal-agent communications the principal can be regarded as the sender and 
the agent as the receiver.  
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 1 approximately here 
-------------------------------------------   
Written contracts are unavoidably incomplete (Walls, 2005; Williamson, 1999) but given that 
historical supply agreements have successfully existed over long periods, such arrangements 
must be partly governed by some informal mechanisms outside the written contract (Coase, 
2006). These may be regarded as unwritten contract management mechanisms. For example, 
close monitoring of contractor performance may signal a climate of distrust (Kadefors, 2008). 
Therefore, while monitoring mechanisms are specified in the written contract, the application 
of particularly close attention to monitoring activities will signal the client’s concern to the 
contractor in relation to performance. Assuming the contractor becomes aware of the signal 
and wishes to prolong the benefits of the contract, this signal will cause the contractor to review 
performance behaviours. The client signal to the agent of closer than usual monitoring activity 
therefore acts as an unwritten contract mechanism. The literature of information economics 
holds that people’s behaviour may be influenced by costly human actions conveying 
information (Stiglitz, 2002). Signals are visible non-transactional costly expenditures of 
interpersonal time intended to influence observers (Spence, 1973).  Within an unwritten 
contract relationship then, signals may be viewed as meaningful actions by the principal 
comprising the costly expenditures of time which are observed by and influence the agent 
towards a response.  
 
It is possible to categorise signals according to how they are sent from a principal and how they 
are observed by an agent. From information economics literature, the expenditure of 
interpersonal time, or willingness to spend time, may communicate interest towards resolving 
disagreement (Spence, 1973). The demonstration of such resources as budgetary control, 
expertise, and social skills, may be an influence persuading others towards action (Lawrence 
et al, 2005). Also, the non-functional attendance of organisational leadership figures at events 
highlights the importance of such events (Spence, 1973). Therefore, a principal may send 
signals to an agent by actions demonstrating personal time spent on contract matters, their 




An agent’s observation of a principal’s signal may provide information, may suggest an 
incentive, or may demonstrate enhanced mutual interest towards securing the contract 
outcomes. For example, observation of a principal’s change from verbal to written 
communication may be a signal of poor performance (Nikander and Eloranta, 1997) and 
labelled a performance signal. Similarly, observation of a principal’s assurance of confidence 
in the agent’s ability may provide an incentive (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) and labelled an 
incentive signal. Thirdly, the observation of a principal’s willingness to discuss a disagreement 
may facilitate reaching a resolution (Spence, 1973) and labelled a mutual interest signal. These 
signals mechanisms, used within the ex post unwritten contract, are summarised in table 2 and 
depicted graphically in figure 2. 
------------------------------------------ 
Table 2 and Figure 2 approximately here 
-------------------------------------------   
 
3.  Methodology 
 
Given the exploratory nature of the research project, and that the aim of the research was to 
generate theory, the project took a qualitative approach based on multiple case studies (Ghauri 
and Gronhaug, 2010:109; Yin, 2009) of public procurement FM services contracts. The study 
adopted an agency theoretic approach with the unit of analysis being the contract itself 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A similar micro-level multiple case approach was taken by Badenfelt 
(2011) to examine response to difficulties with incomplete contracts in IT and construction 
industry projects. The paper draws on an inductive theory-building approach (Mintzberg, 1979) 
to develop a conceptual model of contract management mechanisms. To enable the building of 
theory that is relevant to practitioners (Bowers, 1972) the inductive approach involved the 
collection of qualitative data using a small sample of subjects (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 
2003). Multiple cases allow researchers consider what is unique and what is common across 
cases thereby promoting increased theoretical reflection (Bryman and Bell, 2011:63; Yin, 
2009).  
 
Qualitative data from five FM contracts from one organization (EdCo) were collected and 
examined in detail. Data was collected over eighteen months from archival material including 
contract files, tender documents, legal contracts, correspondence, payments, minutes of 
meetings and emails. Each of the contract principals was interviewed. Notes of the interviews 
were taken and these were examined and analysed along with other case documentation. For 
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each case study a contingency situation was identified and examined and the mechanisms used 




EdCo is a government-funded higher education institution with staff and students 
accommodated in a number of separate buildings in different urban locations in one city. A 
central FM office manages contracts with private firms for services such as waste removal, 
catering, and cleaning services. Each contract had an EdCo principal responsible for the 
contract budget and service delivery. 
 
The details of each FM contract situation are now considered in turn, highlighting the 
mechanisms of the written contract, an arising and previously unforeseen contract contingency, 
and the signal mechanisms used by the principal to promote responses from the agent to address 
the contingency.  
 
 4.1 Waste Removal Contract 
 
The waste removal contract was a five year agreement comprising the removal and disposal of 
wastes from EdCo’s buildings by a licenced contractor WasteCo at an annual cost of €300,000.  
Although initially managed locally, the EdCo FM office decided to centralise the waste 
contract budget and appointed a single EdCo principal to improve transparency. However, in 
line with her understanding of the written contract, the WasteCo agent continued to report to 
the former local EdCo budget holders. The newly appointed EdCo principal met informally 
with the WasteCo agent over coffee to discuss their understanding of the contract, explain that 
she alone was now responsible, and to demonstrate that the new approach should improve 
EdCo’s costs, WasteCo’s regulatory recycling targets, and indeed WasteCo’s prospects for 
tenders with other organisations. Over a number of meetings, the agent offered a central waste 
information report format, and a programme to roll out the recycling building-by-building.   
 
In this contract case, a contingency arose when the principal’s organisation centralised the 
contract budget and management while the written contract did not specify these arrangements. 
The written contract control mechanisms comprised the payments and monthly reports. A 
number of unwritten mechanisms were also evident. The principal sent a time signal by 
spending additional time explaining the new arrangements, and a resource signal by 
demonstrating technical knowledge of regulatory requirements and control of the centralised 
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budget. Incentive and mutual interest signals were evident in the agent’s observance of the 
principal’s encouragement that the changes would improve EdCo prospects and that there was 
a shared interest between the organisations in achieving the benefits of the contract.  
 
4.2 Canteen Catering Contract 
 
This five year contract comprised the provision of catering services by CaterCo to students and 
staff in eight separate locations. CaterCo retained the takings in each location and paid a rent 
to EdCo. A contingency arose when the EdCo principal received reports of poor customer 
service from a CaterCo location manager, and noticed that this location had a lower than 
expected financial turnover. In response, the CaterCo agent advised that this was not a contract 
matter. The EdCo principal then wrote a formal letter highlighting her concerns with a 
comparative financial review of all locations suggesting that financial performance was linked 
to customer care. Separately, she issued an invitation to the CaterCo agent and his senior 
management to attend a fundraising event in EdCo. This provided her with an opportunity to 
comment positively on the agent’s performance and the benefits of the contract to both parties. 
Some weeks later the location manager was reassigned away from customer-facing duties.  The 
CaterCo agent subsequently reported that the financial turnover figures had shown 
improvement. 
 
The contract contingency comprised reports of poor customer service to the principal which 
could not be remedied under the terms of the written contract. The written contract mechanisms 
comprised the retention of sales proceeds, and the monthly reports and meetings. However, a 
number of unwritten mechanisms were also evident. The principal sent a time signal by writing 
a comparative report, a resource signal by demonstrating her financial reporting skills, and a 
position signal by showing that she had access to senior management figures in her 
organisation. In addition, the agent observed a performance signal by the change from verbal 
to formal written communication, an incentive signal in the principal’s positive comments to 
senior management, and a mutual interest signal from the discussion by senior management of 
the shared benefits of the contract.  
 
4.3 Cleaning Contract 
 
A five year cleaning contract was provided by CleanCo to EdCo buildings for a monthly fee 
totalling €2 million per year. When the EdCo annual cleaning budget was cut to €1.7 million, 
the CleanCo agent noted that since the contract had specified fixed tasks at agreed labour rates, 
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the change would be grounds for contract termination.  The EdCo principal proposed that it 
was in both their professional interests to find ways of continuing the contract. She indicated 
her availability for discussions without commitments. She offered to broker any revised 
arrangements with EdCo senior management. Over two months a new approach was identified 
based on changing cleaning times to office hours, focusing on the heavily used areas, and 
setting up a mobile cleaning team. The EdCo principal and CleanCo agent successfully 
approached their respective organisations to endorse the new arrangement at the reduced 
budget.     
 
This unforeseen contingency arose due to the principal’s organisation reducing the contract 
budget. The written contract mechanisms comprised the monthly payments and the monthly 
audits, reports, logs and meetings. A number of unwritten mechanisms were also evident. The 
principal sent a time signal by declaring availability to the agent, a resource signal by 
demonstrating her confidence in gaining approval for any new arrangements, and a position 
signal by indicating her access to the senior management decision-makers in her organisation. 
In addition, the agent observed an incentive signal in the principal’s highlighting of the benefits 
to her managerial reputation in saving the contract, and a mutual interest signal from the 
discussion of the benefits to both organisations in continuing the contract.  
 
4.4 Insurance Brokerage Contract 
 
A five year brokerage contract for insurance and claims management was provided by InsureCo 
for an annual fee of €500,000.  While EdCo academic staff would contact InsureCo prior to 
field trips for confirmation of insurance and other advice, the written contract did not 
specifically require communications to EdCo end users. Over some months, InsureCo showed 
reluctance to take calls and increasingly delayed issuing responses. Following a number of 
telephone conversations, the EdCo principal emailed the InsureCo agent changing the location 
of monthly meetings to her office, increasing the frequency of meetings from monthly to 
weekly, initiating formal written minutes, and instigating a weekly log recording end user 
queries and response completions. The principal explained that EdCo auditors independently 
review information systems on EdCo contracts, and report back to senior management. On 
pointing out that it was in both parties’ interests to record performance data using the proposed 
log, the InsureCo agent agreed to use the log on a trial basis.  After a number of weekly 
meetings, the InsureCo agent resumed taking calls directly from EdCo end users, recording 




The slowed response to calls was a contingency which could not be addressed under the terms 
of the written contract. The written contract mechanisms comprised the annual fee and the 
information meetings. A number of unwritten mechanisms are evident. The principal sent a 
time signal by attending more frequent meetings and a resource signal by promoting the weekly 
log as a management tool. In addition, the agent observed a performance signal by the change 
to formal written minutes, an incentive signal by suffering a time penalty to attend more 
meetings, and a mutual interest signal from the principal’s comment that the improved 
information system would benefit both EdCo and InsureCo.  
 
4.5 Property Contract 
 
The property rental contract comprises a lease on a 2,000 square metre Victorian premises 
which is used as an art school by EdCo. The provider and owner of the premises is PropCo, 
which provides the contract agent to manage the property. The contract terms include a fifteen 
year lease with an annual rent of €390,000 subject to upward-only rent reviews every five years, 
and an internal maintenance obligation on the tenant. While the contract is not the subject of 
frequent tenders, there are tenant break options every five years where EdCo may choose to 
terminate the rental contract. This break option introduces some degree of contestability into 
the contract. The desired contract outcomes for the EdCo principal are the use of a safe property 
suitable for staff offices and student classrooms, workshops, and studios to develop artistic 
knowledge and skills, at a market rental cost that can be demonstrated to be value for money. 
The contract incentives for the agent are EdCo’s quarterly rent payments, and avoidance of 
exercising a break option to exit the lease. In practice, these incentives are fixed, as rent reviews 
are subject to arbitration and exercising the break option would require finding alternative 
accommodation which would be a significant project for EdCo. The contract information 
system comprises site meetings every three months between the principal and agent to review 
matters and agree actions to resolve any issues.  
 
A matter of contract incompleteness became apparent in relation to significant internal repairs. 
In the written contract the EdCo principal is required to repair the interiors while the agent is 
required to perform any required structural works. Over a period of winter months, ingress of 
damp resulted in paint peeling off the internal walls, leading to complaints from staff and 
students regarding the deterioration and the consequent difficulty in fixing the programme 
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artwork to the walls. The agent did concede that the fault was structural in origin, but not accept 
the EdCo principal’s view that the consequential requirement for internal works were his 
responsibility, or that they were urgently required. The principal stated her intention to 
withhold payment of the rent. The agent then emailed proposing that works would be carried 
out at the end of the academic year, and that this would be regarded in court of law as a 
reasonable response time. Despite a number of conversations, no improved proposal was 
received from the agent. At this point the EdCo principal emailed the agent, copying her senior 
manager, summarising the problem and requesting action from the agent. She then asked her 
senior manager to intervene. The EdCo senior manager telephoned from his personal mobile 
telephone directly to the agent’s personal mobile. During the discussion the EdCo senior 
manager suggested that while the issue was not clear in the written contract, many end-users 
were adversely affected, and it was in both their long-term reputational interests for the matter 
to be resolved.  The agent apologised and agreed that he would carry the required structural 
repairs. The following month, all the agreed works were completed. The findings from this 
case and the other four cases are summarised in tables 3 and 4. 
------------------------------------------ 
Table 3 and table 4 approximately here 




All five case studies clearly demonstrate that the contracts as originally written were 
incomplete. In all cases unforeseen contingencies arose for which there were no remedies 
readily available through the written contract. In the cases of Waste Removal and Insurance 
Brokerage the unforeseen contingency initially arose from within the contract itself. In the 
cases of Catering and Cleaning the contingencies stemmed from organisational actions or 
decisions. In the case of PropCo the contingency arose due to an external factor: adverse 
weather conditions. In all five cases both the principal and the agent were motivated to find 
solutions to continue the contract and developed approaches based on informal, unwritten 
arrangements.  
 
In no case however was the written contract discarded or breached. The solution approach 
involved finding a nuanced agreement between the principal and the agent. The client made its 
wishes known through signals to the contractor; the contractor interpreted these signals and 
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formulated a response. All three kinds of signal given in figure 2 – time, resource, and position 
- were used, although not all on each occasion. They were however always used in combination 
and for several of the contracts all three kinds of signal were used. On some occasions, for 
example the Property contract, the client had to give multiple signals to the contractor before 
they responded to the client’s satisfaction. The solution to the problem still fell broadly within 
the boundaries of the original contract and often included mechanisms drawn from the contract. 
For example while meetings were provided for in the written contract dissatisfaction was 
signalled by increasing their frequency, making them more formal, or by inviting senior 
managers along. 
 
The findings suggest a new conceptual framework of ex post contract management that 
includes the original contract with its standard remedies of information systems and incentives 
but also includes unwritten elements including performance, incentive and mutual interest 
signals (figure 3). The model highlights the written contract mechanisms that exist to influence 
the agent to achieve the contract goals: firstly, incentives such as payments or penalties and, 
secondly, information systems such as site meetings, audits, and reports. The model also 
highlights the existence of remedies outside the written contract for handling contingencies that 
arise during the performance of the contract. For the purposes of the conceptual model, these 
approaches are termed the unwritten contract and comprise signals. The principal sends signals 
to appeal to the agent to respond to contingencies not covered by the written contract. These 
signals are based on the principal’s non-functional expenditure of personal time with the agent, 
demonstration of control of resources, or access to positions of organisational leadership. The 
agent observes any or all of these behaviours by the principal, and views them as performance 
signals, incentive signals, or mutual interest signals. These influence the agent’s decision to 
make a new response. 
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 3 approximately here 
-------------------------------------------   
6. Conclusion 
 
This study examined five case studies of contracts in their implementation stages, with all five 
demonstrating the incompleteness of the written contract terms to provide remedies, and the 
use of signals in managing those contingencies that arose towards useful solutions. The study 
uses an inductive theory-building approach to develop a novel conceptual model of contract 
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management comprising of written and unwritten contracts with the latter initiated mainly by 
signals. It uses an information economics perspective of signals as the expenditure of human 
time in non-functional activities to convey information (Spence, 1973).  
 
This study makes a number of contributions to theory and practice. In terms of practice, it 
demonstrates that written contracts do not always provide a solution to ex post contingencies 
that arise with respect to a contracted service. It demonstrates that use of signals by the principal 
can allow a nuanced solution to be found to deal with arising contingencies. With respect to 
theory, the paper puts forward a model of ex post contract management (figures 2 and 3) that 
provides additional levers by which a principal can implement and control a service contract. 
This set of contract management levers draws from both the written and the unwritten contract. 
In particular the research highlights the active use of time, resource and position signals as 
service contract management levers, and that these signals can be used in conjunction with 
levers from the written contract such as incentives and information systems. This combination 
of levers from the written and unwritten contracts provides a strong theoretical framework for 
ex post contract management, a framework that is accessible to practitioners. The paper also 
provides an application of agency theory to real life facilities management contract situations.  
 
The paper has implications for practicing FM services contract managers. It underscores the 
benefits of widely discussing the detailed written contract specifications ex-ante with 
organisational stakeholders to provide a wider range of ex post remedies. It highlights the 
importance of careful attention in the design of the contract ex ante to contain clauses to provide 
reasonable contract options by the parties ex post in response to contingencies previously 
experienced by FM managers. It underscores the potential of the unwritten contract and the 
potential of principals’ signals to influence agents’ responses towards resolving unforeseen 
contingencies. It highlights the potential usefulness of theory-building to facilities managers in 
the search for practical service solutions for their organisations.  
 
The study has the limitations of being exploratory and based on a limited sample of empirical 
cases. Future research could include a study of contract mechanisms using a larger sample of 
cases to provide greater generalisability. This paper examined situations where the client 
organization required a remedy and the response generally required the contractor to extend 
itself in some way in order to accommodate the client requirements. Other contract contingency 
situations may require the client to alter its behaviour due to signals from the contractor. This 
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reverse signalling was not examined in this paper but may provide an avenue for future 
research. Another direction for future research would to examine signals as ex post contract 
management mechanisms from the perspective of the psychological contract. While the theory 
of the psychological contract more usually discusses the relationship between the employer 
and employee, it views signals as spoken and unspoken communications of intentions 
influencing behaviours of agents (Rousseau, 1995). Such a perspective may present 
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Table 1 Contract management approaches (derived from agency theory) 
Agency theory ex 
post mechanisms 
Example Source 
Incentives Time and materials payments 
Fixed price payments 
Bajari & Tadelis (2001)   
Sappington & Stiglitz (1987) 
Eisenhardt (1985) 
 











Table 2 Contract management approaches (derived from signals theory) 
Signals ex post 
mechanisms 
Example Source 
Time Principal expends interpersonal time with the agent 
on contract matters  
Spence (1973)  
Resource Principal demonstrates control of the necessary 
budget, expertise and skills to manage the contract  
Lawrence et al (2005) 
Position Principal demonstrates  his/her senior organisational 
position, or his/her access to senior figures in the 
organisation 
Spence (1973) 
Performance Agent observes changes from informal verbal to 
formal written means of communication by the 
principal 
Nikander & Eloranta (1997) 
Incentive Agent observes the principal’s assurances on his/her 
ability to perform the contract or  the likely benefits 
of a good performance 
Bénabou & Tirole (2003) 
Mutual interest Agent observes that the principal is willing to discuss 








Table 3 Characteristics of the written contracts and their ex post situations 


















did not specify a 
single point of 
contact in EdCo 
Lack of reports; 
Delay in roll-out 
of recycling 
programme 
Catering Provision of 
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clause to allow 
changes to 
































Lack of clarity as 
to who is 
responsible for  









Table 4  Ex post contract management mechanisms 
Contract Written Contract 
Mechanisms - Agency Theory 
Unwritten Contract Mechanisms – Signals   
Agent 
Response 
Signals sent by principal (P) Signals observed by agent (A) 
Incentives Information 
Systems 




Prompt  payment 
of waste charges  
Monthly waste 
reports and site 
meetings 








control of budget 
    A hears principal 
indicate that 
changes  may 
benefit WasteCo 
in future tenders 
A observes 
principal’s view 
of benefits and  
shared interest of  
EdCo + WasteCo 
Agent implements 
new waste reports, 
and recycling 
programme 
Catering Retention of 





meetings   
Spends time 
writing a report 
for the agent.  
Exhibits technical 
knowledge  in her 











from verbal to 
written letter 






expression of  the 
expected mutual 
benefits of the 
relationship   
Agent replaces 
unhelpful canteen 
manager   
Cleaning Monthly 
payments 
amounting to €2 
million per year 
Monthly audits 
and reports, a 
complaints log, 
and a monthly 
meeting 








within  her own 
organisation 
Indicated that she 
had access to 
senior decision 
makers in EdCo 
 Agent sees 




Agent hears that 
both P’s and her 
interests served 
by continuing the 
contract. 
Agent re-specifies 
tasks to reduce 
















weekly log as a 
management tool 
  Agent views 
change to formal 
written minutes 
of meetings   
Agent suffers a 
time penalty in 
attending more 
frequent meetings   
Agent hears that 
the weekly log 
promotes 
prospects of both 
parties 
Agent adopts the 











Increased use of 






knowledge of the 
law 

















































Sender Signal Receiver Influence Intentions 
Signal     
Performance   
Incentive    
Mutual 
interest   
Time     
Position 
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